Until recently, the name "Afghanistan" had an exotic ring to many, but not
to US policy-makers. For a decade (1979-1989) they backed the Afghan war against
the Soviet Union, contributing to the latter's collapse. The new world order
had its start, one might say, in this desolate country, although it reached
its heyday a short time later in the Gulf War.
Among the "Mujahidin" who fought the Soviet Union were some who refused
to accept the new world order. They saw the Afghan victory as a sign of Islamic
superiority. The anti-Soviet war was a struggle against an Infidel Empire.
The support they had received from America seemed to them merely a temporary
conjunction of interests.
The existence of these maverick groups, with their offbeat interpretation,
aroused no misgivings in Washington. There were two reasons for complacency.
One was the lopsided balance of forces: a great world power could hardly feel
threatened by scattered bands of lightly armed fighters. Secondly, these former
allies continued to collaborate in the US campaign to smash the Yugoslav federation,
first in Bosnia, later in Kosovo. They also inflamed the war against Russia
in Chechnya; here they cooperated with American oil companies, which sought
to secure the energy resources of the Caspian Sea.
In Afghanistan, one of these groups, the Taliban, took power by force in
1996. It sheltered and sustained Osama Bin Laden, who issued a religious decree
in 1998 calling for jihad, holy war, against the US. Yet here an additional
factor blinded Washington: its regional allies, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and
the United Arab Emirates, all supported the Taliban with arms and money. Indeed,
the sole recognition of the Taliban government came from these three.
How could America's main Muslim allies support the Taliban, who backed Osama
Bin Laden's decree of jihad? And why did America fail to take the threat seriously?
In order to answer these questions, we need to examine the roots of the
current war. Whatever may have been Osama Bin Laden's role in igniting the
conflict, it is a mistake to attribute the unprecedented attacks of September
11 to his extremist views alone. Extremism thrives in a specific political,
social and economic reality, which is that of most peoples today. It is by
no means typical to Islam. We find it among those former Yugoslavs who have
since become ultra-nationalistic, or in Italy and Austria, where Fascists
are again in government, or among the perpetrators of massacre in Africa,
and even in the US itself, among Christian fundamentalists eagerly awaiting
Armageddon. Extremism is an epidemic of global proportions.
[Blurb:] America backed the Afghan war against the Soviet Union, contributing
to the latter's collapse. The name "Afghanistan", then, is directly connected
to America's global hegemony. The new world order had its start in this desolate
country.
I. Afghanistan: forsaken land
From 1979 until 1989, the US was extremely busy in Afghanistan, then ruled
by forces of the Soviet Union. America saw the Soviet presence as a threat
to its influence in central Asia, and especially as a threat to its allies,
Pakistan and Turkey. The Iranian revolution had recently toppled the Shah.
This trauma heightened America's anxiety about Afghanistan's fall to the Soviets.
As a counterweight, Anwar Sadat signed the Camp David Accords, crossing to
the Western bloc. Yet because of his subsequent isolation in the Arab world,
his about-face did not reassure America concerning the area's future.
In order to realize its ambition of shaping events in Afghanistan, the US
needed a more aggressive foreign policy. That required an internal transformation.
It happened at the end of 1980, when conservative Republican Ronald Reagan
defeated Democrat Jimmy Carter. Reagan entered the White House armed with
an extreme anti-Soviet political program. Almost immediately he found a close
ally in Pakistan's leader, General Zia al-Haq, who had overthrown the legal
government of Ali Bhutto three years earlier.
The Carter Administration had imposed sanctions on Pakistan because of its
nuclear-weapons program and abuses of human rights; Reagan promptly canceled
them. He provided generous military assistance. Pakistan became third among
the nations receiving US foreign aid. (Digital National Security Archive.*)
In return, it supported US policy.
In order to win domestic legitimacy for his dictatorial regime, General
Zia began to depend on Islamist tendencies. While suppressing political parties
and canceling freedoms, he tried to give the regime a new identity. Among
the religious movements he relied on was Jama'at al-Islam, a right-wing fundamentalist
party founded in 1941. Zia gave it broad powers to administer the educational
system, including the universities. He also helped it gain influence over
the media. (Alavi.)
The power of this party extended to all aspects of life, including the military,
arousing concern within the Pakistani opposition. The idyll between Zia and
the Islamists reached its height in 1980, when Islamic law (Shariah) became
the law of the land.
The fundamentalist character of Pakistan's regime did not bother Washington.
On the contrary, the CIA adopted a view put forth by Pakistan's ISI (Inter-Services
Intelligence): the Islamic extremists in Afghanistan must be aided in their
struggle against the more educated, liberal, left-leaning classes.
On the advice of General Zia, the US decided to back the Afghan Islamist
party, headed by Gulb a-Din Hekmatyar. The CIA's intent was to place him in
charge of a front that would liberate Afghanistan from Soviet occupation.
The preference for Hekmatyar derived from his ethnic affiliation. His group,
the Pashtun, dwell on both sides of the Pakistani-Afghan border. It is the
biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Other leaders who initially fought the
Soviets, such as Burhan a-Din Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masoud, both of the Tajiki
minority, failed to get the massive support from Pakistan that Hekmatyar did.
Another factor also weighed against them: they didn't seem obedient enough.
(Singh.)
In 1987, American military assistance to the Afghan rebels reached $700
million - more than Pakistan got. The CIA took care to equip them with new
high-grade weapons. Yet the agency took care, also, that the arms should
not come directly from the US. It wanted to obscure the American presence
in the area. (Digital National Security Archive, 2001.) In order to diminish
financial activity between the US and Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia was engaged
to transfer large sums of money from its accounts, which the CIA managed
behind the scenes. When Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, the country
sank into civil war. The various Muslim forces that had fought together could
not agree about apportioning power. Hekmatyar, still supported by Pakistan,
failed to capture Kabul, the capital. The battles between his forces and
those of his rival, Ahmad Shah Masoud, tore the country to pieces. Anarchy
reigned.
II. The Taliban Conquest of Afghanistan
The Taliban movement has its origin in a network of religious schools, established
in Pakistan by another Islamist party, Jama'iyyat Ulama al-Islam. In the early
nineties, some four thousand madrassas (boarding schools) sprang up all over
Pakistan, especially near the Afghan border (where two million Afghan refugees
were living in camps). These schools included not only refugee children, but
also sons of wealthy Pakistani families. At present they have half a million
pupils. (Rashid.)
Until 1993 Jama'iyyat Ulama al-Islam was still a rather isolated party in
Pakistani politics. Then, however, it joined the government of Benazir Bhutto.
The coalition was headed by the Pakistani People's Party (PPP). Under this
aegis, the madrassas of Jama'iyyat Ulama al-Islam trained their pupils within
a military and political framework. Out of it came the Taliban movement, under
the supervision and responsibility of Pakistan's ISI.
In August 1994, the Pakistani regime decided to use the Taliban in order
to establish control over Afghanistan, where it intended to impose order and
stability. It sent the young fighters to carry out the task in which Hekmatyar
had failed. (Pakistan had become disenchanted with Hekmatyar four years before
in the Gulf crisis: he had taken a pro-Iraqi stance. This had also angered
his patrons, the Saudis.)
The chief of Jama'iyyat Ulama al-Islam, Mullah Fadel al-Rahman (once head
of the Pakistani parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee) at this time made
a series of visits to Saudi Arabia. His aim was to persuade the Saudis to
support the new Pakistani policy in Afghanistan. The head of the Saudi secret
service, Prince Turki al-Faisal, then paid a visit to the Taliban's center
at Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Pakistan's pressure bore fruit: the Saudis
decided to finance the Taliban. (Hiro.)
They had an additional motive to do so. Jama'iyyat Ulama al-Islam and the
Taliban belong to an Islamic school of thought known as Deoband, named after
the Indian town where it was founded in 1867. This school is based on a separatist,
reactionary interpretation of Islam. Deoband is very close to the Wahabi school,
to which the Saudi royal family belongs.
The US joined its allies in aiding the Taliban movement, ignoring its cruelty
toward Afghan citizens. Washington pursued a single objective only: control
over the oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea. On September 26, 1996,
after seven years of civil war, the Taliban captured Kabul, the capital. They
imposed their authority and secured, for a short time, a measure of stability.
(Maroofi.)
One year later a contract was signed between, on the one hand, a group of
oil companies including America's Unocal and Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil, and,
on the other, the government of Turkmenistan (formerly a Soviet republic).
The agreement included the laying of a pipeline 790 km. long, from the gas
fields of Turkmenistan on the Caspian Sea to the Indian Ocean. The pipeline
was supposed to pass through Afghanistan and Pakistan, enabling the Americans
to bypass Iran and Russia. The Taliban government promised Pakistan to keep
the area around the pipeline stable. (Haque.)
Trud, a Russian newspaper, quoted the assistant director of Unocal, Chris
Taggart, on October 29, 1997 as follows: "If Taliban stabilizes the situation
in Afghanistan and can gain international recognition, the possibilities of
constructing a pipeline will be significantly improved."
In August 1998, the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar al-Salam were
bombed. The attacks were linked to Osama Bin Laden, now based in Afghanistan
under the aegis of the Taliban government. Three months later, Unocal canceled
its part in the pipeline deal.
The Taliban victory in Afghanistan resulted not from divine intervention,
rather from the support of Pakistan's army and secret service, together with
American and Saudi money. In less abnormal circumstances, even all these would
not have sufficed. One more element was required: Afghanistan's sheer backwardness.
Were it not for that, a movement with so benighted an interpretation of Islam
could never have taken over. This movement could only find footing in a country
lacking the infrastructure of modern life.
III. A utopian plan to restore the caliphate
In 1995 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was visiting Ethiopia when an attempt
was made on his life. It was linked to associates of Osama Bin Laden, then
in Sudan. Egypt and Saudi Arabia brought pressure to bear on Sudan, which
expelled Bin Laden. He returned to Afghanistan in May 1996. On September 26,
Taliban forces entered Kabul and took control of the country.
The intimate relation between Bin Laden and the Taliban did not result from
any interest on his part in the welfare of the Afghan people. The need to
restore the ravaged land had no place on his agenda. On the contrary, devastation
and backwardness provided fertile soil for his megalomaniac program: to turn
Afghanistan into a major base of jihad fighters for the sake of Islamic conquest.
The Taliban movement did not establish a modern system of government. It
did not aim to solve the economic and social crisis, caused by years of war
and drought. Instead, through a special police system, it set about enforcing
its reactionary Wahabi version of Islam. The new laws proscribed, among other
things, listening to music or making art. Afghan women paid the highest price.
The Taliban forbade them to study or work or even, except under strictly defined
conditions, to go out of doors.
The Taliban did bring relative stability, however, which stopped the flow
of refugees to Pakistan. This neighbor viewed the new government in a favorable
light and acted as its patron. To Pakistan, a friendly Afghanistan is a source
of strategic depth. It provides vital help in the confrontation with India
over the control of central Asia. In particular, the Taliban jihad fighters
reinforce pro-Pakistan troops in disputed Kashmir. In the border battles of
May 1999, between India and Pakistan, Bin Laden's forces played a major role.
Thus, despite its poverty and devastation, Afghanistan has become a crucial
zone for regional and global interests. The Taliban government, for its part,
has chained the Afghan people to its struggle for the Islamic nation. The
aim is nothing less than to impose its reactionary version of Islam on a global
scale. For starters, it did not balk at cooperation with America. The jihad
fighters joined Uncle Sam in conflicts ranging from the Balkans through Chechnya
to the Philippines. Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban developed a symbiotic
relationship. The latter adopted the former's utopian program, according
to which all Muslims should unite beneath a restored caliphate. They should
rid the Muslim world of infidels and cancel national borders. The effect
of Bin Laden's vision would be to isolate the Muslim world. He believes he
can only achieve this goal by the violent overthrow of existing Arab regimes.
His organizational tool is the al-Qaeda movement. This arose during the anti-Soviet
revolt, as a means of coordinating Arab volunteers who came to help the Afghans.
Bin Laden has outlined his program to the Al-Jazeera television network.
He wants to restore the type of regime that existed under the "Rashidun caliphate".
(The term refers to the first four successors of the Prophet Muhammad; they
are considered to have been righteous men, compared to the corrupt and divided
leaders of later periods.) Unlike other Muslim visionaries, however, Bin Laden
intends to put his program into practice at once, beginning with the Arab
world but not stopping there. He wants, that is, to replace the existing global
regime with an Islamic one.
In his desire to change the world, Bin Laden does not contemplate a protracted
process of persuasion; he does not seek to build an alternative with a broad
social base and a political organization. He does not believe in mobilizing
the masses to the point where they will be ready to overthrow the regime.
His approach is rather the shortcut known as jihad. Only thus, he believes,
will he awaken the oppressed to action. He counts on the despair and frustration
to which American policies have led during the last decade. Yet without a
firm social alternative, despair and frustration have never sufficed to change
reality.
Despite the dramatic effects of the recent terrorist attacks, there is nothing
new in their underlying concept: a group of extremists undertook a spectacular
act, aimed at arousing the masses to action. The same concept guided the Bader-Meinhof
group in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy and the Montoneros in Argentina.
Such organizations, whether left or right, were far removed ideologically
from the Islam of Osama Bin Laden. Yet all shared a belief that terror would
pave the way for change. All shared, that is, the quality of impatience.
Their end was abject failure. Their adventurist tactics enabled the authorities
to isolate and eliminate them. Their terrorist acts provided a pretext to
put down, in addition, more patient revolutionary movements, which were engaged
in the slow work of building a true alternative. In contrast with the communist
parties, the radical groups, misinterpreting Marx, sought to take power solely
through armed struggle. Violent actions were to replace the mobilization
of the masses, trade unions and political parties. Bin Laden has learned
nothing from the dismal fate of the "leftist jihad", whose fighters were
no less devoted than his. The hatred and spite that he harbors toward the
working class, or anything that smacks of socialism, have prevented his learning
from others' experience. He is leading his supporters to a similar doom.
IV. Decline of the global jihad
In February 1998, Bin Laden and Aiman al-Zawahari, leader of Egypt's Islamic
jihad, united various Islamic groups under a single roof: "The Global Islamic
Front Against the Jews and the Crusaders." Clerics who identified with the
Front published a fatwa (a decree of Islamic law), stating: "To kill Americans
and their allies, civilian or military, is an obligation for every Muslim
capable of doing so, wherever possible. This decree will be in effect until
the liberation of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque (in Mecca - YBE)
and until their armies withdraw from all the lands of Islam." (al-Quds al-Arabi,
February 1998). This decree was a desperate measure. It was meant to revive
the jihad groups, whose status, for reasons we shall now explore, had been
severely shaken in the Arab world.
1. The failure of jihad in Algeria
After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, about ten thousand
Arab volunteers who had fought with the Afghan rebels found themselves idle.
Under the leadership and guidance of Bin Laden, they established a secret
network of armed activists in several lands. The first target was Algeria,
whose army, in 1991, had grabbed power in a coup against the party that had
won that year's election, namely, the "Front for Islamic Salvation". Five
years after this coup, the GIA ("Armed Islamic Groups") appeared in Algeria.
It was subject to Bin Laden. It proclaimed a jihad against the Algerian army
and its rural militias. In the subsequent fighting, both sides massacred innocent
Muslims by the hundreds of thousands. The blood of civilians flowed until
the autumn of 1997, when the Front for Islamic Salvation declared a cease
fire. The GIA refused to accept it, continuing its terrorist operations. This
resulted in its isolation and repudiation by the Algerian masses. (Benramdane.)
2. ... and in Egypt
The fate of jihad groups in Egypt was no different. Their terrorist acts
failed to overthrow the regime. At first they tried unsuccessfully to assassinate
government officials. In a later phase, they killed tourists. In addition
to destroying lives, these assaults caused serious economic damage, for tourism
is Egypt's main source of foreign currency. The jihad fighters also made terrorist
attacks on the Copts, a Christian minority in Egypt, in an attempt to awaken
inter-religious hostilities. But the Egyptian public turned its back on such
extremism. It gave its support, instead, to the more moderate Islamic school,
which seeks to ally itself with the regime. The activists of the moderate
Islamic movements make up an important part of the Egyptian economic elite.
They hold numerous jobs in government administration, religious institutions,
universities, trade unions and non-profit associations. Their offices connect
them to the regime. As a matter of course, these activists have influence
with the masses. They have managed to isolate the jihad groups, preventing
them from overturning the government.
3. ... and in Sudan
The heaviest blow to the jihad movement came in Sudan. At first things went
superlatively. In 1989 Sheikh Hassan Turabi and General Omar Bashir conducted
a military coup against the country's democratically-elected government. The
new regime invited Osama Bin Laden to live and work in Sudan. In the mid-1990's,
however, General Bashir began warming up to the West. He banished Bin Laden
in 1996. Three years later he placed Turabi himself under house arrest. In
the same period, the regime permitted the CIA to open offices in Sudan.
4. ... and in Arab lands
The jihad groups also failed to make progress in Arab countries. This fact
shows the difference between the reality in those countries and that in Afghanistan.
The masses of the Arab lands rejected all attempts to impose Islamic dictatorship.
The workers, the peasants and the liberal intelligentsia are simply not willing
to enter a Dark Age of fanaticism.
5. ... and beyond
The jihad forces have also attempted to impose their vision outside the
Arab world, but with little success. Their apparent achievements in Bosnia
and Kosovo did not come about because of superlative military capability.
Their interests coincided temporarily with those of the West, that was all.
This collaboration was based on a common desire to reduce Russian influence
by dismantling the Yugoslav federation. One expression of this strange harmony
occurred in Israel. The government of Yitzhak Rabin joined hands with the
local Islamic movement in 1993, absorbing dozens of Muslim refugees from Bosnia.
The Islamic movement lost its enthusiasm, however, upon discovering that
the refugees were blond and secular. Finally, the kibbutzim took them in.
The jihad groups also suffered defeat in Chechnya and Dagastan. Here the
Mujahidin operated in response to the call of America, which wanted to secure
control of the oil-rich Caspian Sea. Under American protégé
Boris Yeltsin, Russia was passive. The dismemberment of Yugoslavia, its historic
ally, had continued with impunity. This passivity stopped, however, as soon
as the American slicing machine threatened the Caucasus. Under pressure of
Russian public opinion, Yeltsin refused an American demand to place international
observers in Chechnya. Soon after that he resigned, yielding power to Vladimir
Putin (who promised not to use incriminating material against him). Putin
then launched a campaign to wipe out the Chechnyan rebels. Riding on a wave
of nationalist enthusiasm, he won support from the Russian people, who felt
humiliated by the decline in their country's international status. He achieved
the acme of popularity when he conquered Grozni, the Chechnyan capital, and
ground it to bits.
For the jihad, then, things did not go so well here as they had in Bosnia
and Kosovo. Extremist Islam failed elsewhere as well. In May 1999, Pakistan's
army worked together with the Taliban and Bin Laden's jihad fighters in a
joint attack on the province of Kashmir in India. It ended in dismal defeat.
On all fronts, then, Osama Bin Laden's jihad fighters lost ground. The attacks
on America occurred after their movement had reached a dead end. They hoped
to recoup prestige by a sensational action. It would catalyze the necessary
confrontation with the Infidels. At its end, they believed, would come Redemption.
V. Operation "Day of Judgment"
The Islamic awakening did not progress at the rate Osama Bin Laden desired.
At the same time, however, the status of the US itself declined in the Arab
and Muslim worlds. Popular rage against America (and Israel) came to a head
in October 2000, when the masses went into the streets in support of the Intifada.
Bin Laden did not ignore this. These energies, he understood, were directed
not only against Israel and Washington, but also against America's Arab allies,
above all Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Massive demonstrations broke out in the whole Arab world, including the
Gulf states, and among the Arabs in Israel. The opposition to America focused
on three issues: (1) Its one-sided support for Israel against the Palestinians;
(2) its sanctions against Iraq; and (3) its support for India against Pakistan.
Behind these issues lay a broader background of unemployment, poverty and
backwardness.
Arab public opinion made it difficult for the regimes to maintain open,
friendly relations with the US. As soon as the Intifada broke out, they hastened
to convene an Arab summit - the first since the Gulf War - to deflect the
criticism. They changed their line to save their skins. Egypt and the Gulf
States had established diplomatic and economic relations with Israel during
the nineties. They had supported the Palestinian surrender at Oslo. Now,
suddenly, they launched a crude propaganda campaign against Israel and America.
The campaign has lasted a year. It has included most of the Arab media, from
newspapers to satellite TV. It has filled an important function in awakening
popular feeling to identify with the Intifada. Within Arab public opinion,
it has created the impression of an imminent war against "the Jews and Crusaders".
Islamist forces did score points on the Israeli front, although without
connection to Bin Laden. First, under the military pressure of the Hizballah
(the Islamic "Party of God"), Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in May
2000. Fanatical Islamic organizations continued to carry out suicide attacks
inside the country. These successes tended to nourish, among extremists,
the feeling that the moment of decision was near. Islam seemed capable of
leading the faithful to victory. In the upsurge of faith, the real balance
of forces was forgotten.
There are fundamental differences between the terrorist actions in New York
and Washington, on the one hand, and the struggle of Hizballah and Hamas on
the other. The latter carefully avoid any damage to American interests. They
act within a carefully defined political framework. The Hizballah coordinate
their actions with Syria and Iran; they claim legitimacy from international
law. As for Hamas, it rarely strays beyond "red lines" established by the
PA (Palestinian Authority). When it does, the PA arrests its leaders. The
attacks on America, in contrast, were not intended to liberate conquered territory
or achieve a well-defined practical end. The intent was more grandiose than
that: to create strategic parity between the Islamic world and that of the
Infidel. What kind of framework, then, is guiding Bin Laden? What are his
"red lines"? How does he dare to launch an attack such as far greater powers
would never dream of? We should recall, first, that he and his companions
believed they had recently defeated the Soviet Union. Furthermore, although
Bin Laden considered the forces at his disposal and weighed his steps, his
assessments were off. We have mentioned the strategic depth that Afghanistan
gives Pakistan in the latter's conflict with India. Bin Laden apparently believed
that Pakistan, in turn, would provide him with strategic depth in his jihad
against "Crusader" America.
What could have led him to such a miscalculation? Did he really believe
that Pakistan would stand with him? Apparently. Behind his mistake lay two
events: the Islamic bomb and the coup by General Pervez Musharaf.
(1) On May 28, 1998 Pakistan carried out a successful nuclear test. This
had a tremendous effect on the Muslim states in the region, including the
fundamentalist movements. Saudi Arabia was among the first to cheer. Much
of its enthusiasm derived from the fact that its two major enemies, Iraq and
Iran, are well underway toward developing their own.
In the three years since that event, Pakistanis have observed each May 28
as "The Great Day": the anniversary of the first successful nuclear test by
an Islamic state. In the Great Day celebrations of the year 2000, the Pakistani
Minister of Science declared, "We bow down before God Almighty, who restored
her greatness to Pakistan on May 28, 1998." (Goldberg.)
Sami ul-Haq, who heads Jama'iyyat Ulama al-Islam and serves in Pakistan's
parliament, has published a fatwa declaring jihad against any Pakistani government
that signs an agreement preventing nuclear tests. Ul-Haq, a fervent supporter
of Bin Laden, also heads a religious school. Many of his graduates have joined
the Taliban. The Associated Press reported in October 1998 as follows: "Many
militants want Pakistan to continue development of nuclear weapons, both as
a deterrent to longtime enemy India and as an equalizer for the Islamic world
in its dealings with the West." (Gannon.) Muslim extremists interpreted Pakistan's
nuclear tests as a gift from heaven. God granted them the bomb as a thing
to use. The West had tried to prevent Islam from getting what others in Asia,
Europe and America had, but Pakistan's success ended that.
Bin Laden and his organization now awaited their chance to declare a jihad
against America. The Musharaf coup, to which we now turn, signaled for them
the approach of Judgment Day.
(2) At the time of the nuclear test, Nawaz Sharif was still president of
Pakistan. He tried to reach agreement with India over Kashmir. Behind his
back, General Pervez Musharaf led the army and the jihad militias, attacking
inside that province. He meant to torpedo the pending agreement. Like all
Pakistani generals, Musharaf feared that a treaty with India would weaken
the army's domestic position. This army draws its power and influence from
a strange mix of modern arms and Muslim extremism, aimed against the arch-infidels,
India and America.
The Musharaf offensive ended in failure, as I have mentioned. Pakistanis
blamed the defeat on a change in American policy. Until the Clinton Administration,
the US had sided with them. But Clinton had switched sides, favoring India.
This had outraged the Pakistani public, as well as the army. Bin Laden compared
the switch to America's preference for Israel over the Palestinians. In October
1999, Musharaf deposed Sharif. An ultra-nationalist was now at the helm in
Pakistan, backed by an army with strong Islamic connections.
Behind Osama Bin Laden's miscalculation, then, lay three beliefs: First,
Pakistan with its nuclear bomb could function as an independent Islamic power,
giving him strategic depth against "Jews and Crusaders". Second, Musharaf
would surely support him. And third, as mentioned, there was the abiding conviction
that he and his colleagues had done it before: they had (with a little help
from their American friends) defeated one superpower already.
VI. Saudi Arabia - The Weak Link
To understand America's difficulty in coping with the Bin Laden phenomenon,
we need to explore the complex relations between the US and Saudi Arabia.
We have mentioned the latter's cooperation with the CIA in financing the Afghan
Mujahidin. With the passage of time, however, a conflict of interest has
developed between Riyadh and Washington. After the attacks on the American
embassies in Nairobi and Dar al-Salam (August 1998), the US retaliated against
Bin Laden's bases in Afghanistan, as well as a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan
(which it claimed was making chemical weapons). On February 8, 1999, the
New York Times quoted CIA Director George Tenet as telling Congress that Bin
Laden could strike "at any time" against symbols of American power. The Times
noted a consensus, among US policy makers, "that Bin Laden has strong political
support even among American allies abroad." He "receives money and political
support from princes of the Saudi royal family, whose king he has vowed to
depose, and from powerful people and financial institutions in Kuwait and
Qatar, where there is a strong American military presence, U.S. officials
said." (Weiner.)
Washington wasn't blind to the seriousness of the situation. Concerns about
Saudi Arabia's ambivalent relation to America had begun to grow after June
25, 1996. On that date an explosion in an American base at Khobar in Saudi
Arabia killed 19 US soldiers. The Saudi government refused to cooperate with
Washington in investigating the incident. On the contrary, the Saudis did
all they could to conceal information and keep the Americans >from gathering
evidence. To this day, five years later, the incident at Khobar remains a
mystery. No one has been brought to trial. Louis Freeh, head of the FBI, "gave
an example of how the Americans were cold-shouldered: the Chevrolet used
in the attack had been found at the start of July 1996, but it took more
than six months and the most highly-placed intercessions before the FBI was
allowed to examine the vehicle." (Middle East International.)
Saudi Arabia attempted to create the impression that Iran-backed Shi'ites
had made the attack. Its version did not persuade Washington. On July 6, 2001
the Al-Jazeera television network broadcast a talk show called "More Than
One View" (Aktar min Rai), including Saudi and Iranian participants. They
exposed several important facts concerning the attack in Khobar. Dr. Sa'ad
al-Fakiyya, head of the Islamic Reform Movement in Saudi Arabia, called in
to say, "Let's be clear. A group of six Sunni Muslims was arrested in connection
with the attack at Khobar. Their link to it has in effect been proved. These
six∑ aren't the only ones. Hundreds were arrested after the attack, in a
wide-ranging action that brought in everyone who was thought to be a supporter
or who had any connection whatever to the war in Afghanistan."
Dr. al-Fakiyya explained why the Saudis kept the Americans from investigating:
"If this group or another, in the attacks at Riyadh or Khobar, is shown to
be connected to Bin Laden, it will demonstrate that there is a local Sunni
group opposing the regime and threatening its stability. The Saudi fear of
such a revelation led them, instead, to blame the Shi'ite opposition."
The program host, Sami Hadad, added the following: "In October 1998, the
French News Agency cited a source in the Saudi Interior Ministry, who said
that the Saudis had expelled the Taliban representatives because their government
was sheltering people wanted in connection with the attack at Khobar." The
Assistant Editor of al-Shark al-Awsat, Muhammad Awam, confirmed this claim.
How did the Khobar attack affect relations with America? According to the
International Herald Tribune ("Saudi Arabia: The Ties That Bind," December
2, 1996), a senior US official admitted: 'Saudi Arabia is a black hole. We
have enormous gaps in understanding what is going on here.' After the Khobar
attack, the CIA subjected the kingdom to an exceptional analysis procedure
known as 'hard target strategy' (until then reserved for countries like Russia,
China, Iran, Iraq and North Korea) to try to assess the dangers weighing down
on the regime."
The CIA did manage, however, to investigate why the Khobar attackers weren't
brought to trial, but it refrained from publishing the results. We may hazard
a guess as to why: the US discovered how much the political opposition to
the Saudi regime has been growing. Maybe Washington finally understood, too,
that there is broad antagonism to its military presence on Saudi soil. If
the CIA did its homework, it found out that the opposition to the regime is
nourished by a decline in social and economic conditions. The bitterness of
the people increases because of corruption in the royal family, whose members
carry on a life of ostentatious luxury at a time when most Saudis are suffering.
Since 1982, when King Fahd came to the throne, the economy has shrunk drastically.
"In 1993, annual per capita income was $5,000, barely one third of what it
was in the early 1980's. By some estimates, it has since fallen still further.
And politically, all this has aided Islamic fundamentalism, which has grown
at an alarming rate because it is the only popular movement which the government
cannot outlaw." (Aburish.)
Whatever the results of the CIA investigation, it is clear what Washington
decided to do in the wake of the Khobar attack: keep mum. At the same time,
it seems, Saudi Arabia reached understandings with the Taliban and Bin Laden.
The latter agreed to cease attacking inside the Saudi borders. In return,
the Saudis would continue to provide financial support and refrain from bringing
the Khobar attackers to trial. We have no proof of such understandings, but
the fact is, terrorist activity did stop inside the country until an explosion
in Khobar at the start of October 2001, after the attacks on America. (Here
too the pattern has repeated itself: investigation has yielded no publicly
visible results.)
The events of September 11 put an end to Washington's hesitations. The main
editorial in the New York Times for September 25 called on the Saudi government
to cooperate with American intelligence in order to uproot the terrorist organizations
on Saudi soil, as well as their financial sources. This call amounted to
an admission of now undeniable facts: Saudi Arabia gives shelter and support
to extremist Islamic groups, fearing that confrontation will doom a regime
that is already on the edge.
Twelve of the suicide fighters in the attacks on America came from Saudi
Arabia. This fact carries grave implications for the Saudi regime. Its officials
have tried to blur it by saying that the published names are inexact. They
keep American journalists from entering their country. Despite the attempts
at obfuscation, it is certain that most of the Saudi suicide-attackers came
from the poverty-stricken region of Assir (in the southern part of the country,
near the border with Yemen). Here live a number of tribes that are known to
oppose the regime. (Murphy.)
Three years before the attacks on America, in October 1998, Le Monde Diplomatique
published the following analysis: "The Saudi model of alliance between conservative
Islamic fundamentalism and the West has failed. The problem for Washington
is that it has no alternative political strategy vis-à-vis the Muslim
world. On the Saudi side, the double talk of Prince Turki, a convinced pro-American
who has always supported the radical Sunni movements and was still with the
Taliban in the spring of this year, is reaching its limits. Riyadh is spending
large sums of money to fund Islamist networks that actually feel nothing but
contempt for the emirs and their petrodollars and think the Islamic State
of Saudi Arabia would be even more Islamic without the Saud dynasty." (Roy.)
The "Prince Turki" in question is Turki al-Faisal, for thirty years head
of Saudi intelligence and architect of the kingdom's close relations with
the Islamist movements. These relations started with the alliance against
the Soviets in Afghanistan and continued on their lethal course until September
11. (Tyler.) Now they have reached a dead end. Curiously, Prince Turki resigned
or was sacked (no outsider knows) just before the attacks, on August 31; this
has led to speculation that the Saudi regime may have known that something
was afoot.
VII. America with no alternative
It isn't easy to grasp what alternative America has in relation to Afghanistan,
perhaps because she has none. That is why Washington delayed its military
response for almost a month. Even today it is hard to define the purposes
of this war or the standards by which to measure success or failure. It seems
strange that to catch one man and his followers hiding in caves, a great power
moves aircraft carriers and army divisions across vast seas.
This war was imposed on America. Bin Laden and Afghanistan were by no means
on its agenda. Many of the organizations and people labeled "terrorist" after
September 11 had been known to the US Administration for quite some time.
They had operated in America and Europe without interference. Some of Bin
Laden's associates, for example, though sentenced to death by Egypt, won political
asylum in Britain, where they engaged in media activities and ran a ramified
financial network. Before September 11, Washington did not view the massacres
of Algerians by the hundreds of thousands, or the murders of tourists in
Egypt, as a grave enough problem to justify outlawing or restraining these
organizations.
Before September 11, in fact, the foreign policy of the United States was
directed mainly against Russia. America views Russia as a nuclear power that
competes with it for influence in the vital areas of central Europe, the Caspian
Sea and the Persian Gulf. As for Bin Laden, he was not considered as serious
a threat as "rogue states" like Iran, Iraq and North Korea. The main strategic
initiative of George W. Bush was to cancel the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
of 1972 and increase the effort to build an anti-missile defense system,
which was supposed to ensure supremacy over Russia. Although he has not given
this up, the attack on America has shifted priorities and changed the political
map.
The New York Times, on September 27, exposed a small part of the web that
America had woven around Russia: "Russia has helped decisively in preparations
for any military action in Afghanistan and today it was rewarded. The United
States, in a clear shift, stated for the first time that the Al Qaeda network
played a role in inciting the bloody rebellion in the Russian territory of
Chechnya." This new position signifies a sharp turn in the American attitude
toward Russia. Just a few months ago, during his election campaign, Bush threatened
to cut off aid to Russia because of its attacks on Chechnya. During a television
interview in February 2000, Bush said, "This guy, Putin, who is now the temporary
president, has come to power as a result of Chechnya." He added that Putin
dealt with Chechnya in a way "that's not acceptable to peaceful nations."
(Dau.)
Why only now does Washington acknowledge the role Bin Laden played in the
Chechnyan uprising? The answer is simple. Earlier, the US was interested mainly
in besmirching Russia's name and undermining its influence. Osama Bin Laden
seemed a minor problem.
The aid that America gave the Taliban in Afghanistan was a product of the
same strategy. It was the Taliban's role to guarantee an American foothold
in the three Muslim states that border the Caspian Sea and are presently under
Russian influence: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The US preferred
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan because of its absolute dependence on Pakistan.
The alternative "Northern Alliance", supported by Russia and Iran, was repugnant
to American eyes.
Despite Washington's present use of the Northern Alliance as a lever against
the Taliban, it does not see the former as a strategic partner. Nor does it
want to create antagonism with its devoted allies in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
Thus its anti-Taliban stance at first led Iran to support the American cry
for revenge. Soon enough, however, Iran sensed the way the wind was blowing:
it joined the opposition to the US attacks on Afghanistan.
Washington is determined to eliminate Bin Laden and stabilize the Afghan
regime without disturbing the regional balance. If it succeeds in this, it
will continue its Crusade to liberate the sacred Caspian oil fields. It will
seek to bring other nearby lands, such as Georgia, into its orbit.
VIII. The War and the Global Economic Downturn
The roots of the "first war of the 21st century" may be found in the wars
America waged in the 1990's against Iraq and Yugoslavia. It fought against
countries that could offer no resistance, military or economic. It paraded
these wars under enlightened titles such as the defense of ethnic groups,
of human rights, of democracy. Their single purpose, however, was to enforce
a new world order, commanded by the United States. The wars resulted in a
great many victims, the destruction of nation-states, and structural destabilization
on a global scale.
That destabilization was the topic of an article in Le Monde Diplomatique
(June 1999): "When the cold war came to an end, civil conflicts in the developing
world did not. On the contrary they redoubled in intensity. Since the fall
of the Berlin Wall (1989) more than 23 situations of internal warfare have
appeared, or been reactivated - with more than 50 armed groups involved...In
many countries (for instance Angola, Somalia and Sierra Leone) the destructiveness
of these ongoing national conflicts follows a pattern. ...Rebel groups vie
with each other for a monopoly of violence, previously the prerogative of
the state. When this happens, the developing nation-state implodes and turns
into an ungovernable chaotic entity. ...Whole sectors of the economy, towns,
provinces and regions fall under the yoke of new warlords, drug traffickers
or mafia. This is currently the case in Afghanistan..." The article goes on
to name fourteen more "ungovernable chaotic entities," including Somalia,
Kosovo, Bosnia, Chechnya and Haiti. (De Rivero.) Soon the West Bank and Gaza
may join the list, as a result of the American-sponsored Oslo Accords. Structural
instability is the consequence of a global economic regime that furthers the
interests of big industrial concerns, above all the oil companies. Since 1997,
the world has teetered on the edge of economic crisis. This causes direct
damage to two kinds of countries: those with medium-sized economies, such
as Brazil, Argentina and the East Asian "tigers"; and poor ones like Egypt.
The enormous popular rage against America derives from the ravages caused
by its new world order. Millions of people all over the world find themselves
left out of the global economy, with neither income nor future.
The use of force to impose hegemony is a sign of weakness. It shows that
the global capitalist regime is nearing collapse. Anarchy in weaker lands
may be taken as the first sparrow. For the past two years, however, the crisis
has been hitting the big industrial centers. Japan, Europe and America itself
were slipping into recession even before the attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon. These came as a rude awakening: the malignancy has not stayed
locked up within the borders of Africa, Asia or Latin America. It has found
its way to the nerve-center of the capitalist order.
The present and future anarchy does not know borders. New technology and
high-speed transportation, the vital organs of globalization, constitute a
two-edged sword. With all the good they have done, especially for the multinationals,
they also made it possible for nineteen fundamentalist extremists to go to
flying school and strike at the heart of America.
The attack on the US is a warning. The lack of any alternative on a global
scale raises unprecedented dangers. The beginnings of disarray can be seen
already, in the cracks that have opened among the former members of the alliance
against Iraq. They do not go along with the American notion that problems
can be solved by force. They worry that they too may become a target for rage,
with anarchy popping up in their own backyards.
The enemy is evasive. It is not just Bin Laden or the Taliban. The real
enemy is the anarchy America itself has created. The present war will strengthen
this anarchy. The economic crisis, meanwhile, sharpens conflicts of interest
among the more influential states. There is growing danger of nuclear confrontation
between China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, and yes, America and Russia.
Nor can we ignore the rebirth of fascism in Europe. Fascists again stalk the
corridors of power in Italy and Austria. Our world, in short, has gone astray.
Bin Laden and his followers have reminded us how far. But the primary problem
is not terrorism. Society lacks, at present, the will to heal the gravest
illness humanity has ever known: the epidemic of poverty. This is not a poverty
caused by overpopulation, drought or famine. It is a poverty resulting from
an unbounded drive to profit at the expense of others.
Epilogue
Soon after the suicide actions, the New Statesman, a British weekly close
to the Labor Party, included the following analysis in its lead editorial
(Sept. 17, 2001). "Since the communist bloc began to weaken in the 1980s,
and finally collapsed in the 1990s, capitalism has reverted to type, though
with most of the misery exported from the industrialized nations. A world
in which there is only one superpower deprives poor countries of the best
lever for improving themselves that they ever had: if one side wouldn't provide
aid, in cash or kind, they could go straight to the other. True, this kind
of blackmail allowed many cruel and corrupt dictators to retain power. But
you may be sure that, if the Soviet Union were still a reality and a threat,
the debt crisis, which now affects some 50 countries and has reached previously
unimagined levels (some countries have to use a quarter of their export earnings
to service debt), would not exist. ...The death of the Soviet Union also deprived
the global poor of something more intangible: not exactly hope, perhaps,
but the sense of an alternative, of possibility."
These points are clearly beyond the comprehension of Osama Bin Laden and
his band. When he called on Muslims to wage a jihad against American bases
in Saudi Arabia, against the siege on Iraq and against the oppression of the
Palestinians, he forgot one thing: it was he and his followers who helped
bring down the Soviet Union - and who bear, therefore, responsibility for
the ills he rails against.
How otherwise explain the fact that until the fall of the Soviet Union,
the Americans couldn't get a foot in the regional door? How otherwise explain
the fact that until this event, forty years had gone by and no country had
dared fire ballistic missiles on another's cities? How otherwise explain the
fact that the Palestinian people felt forced to accept an agreement amounting
to surrender? Who would ever have imagined, before the fall of the Soviet
Union, that Arab states would stand by America in a war against Iraq? Or that
they would let the option of war against Israel be swept from their hands?
In Lebanon in the early 1980s, when Palestinians resisted Israel and received
support from the Soviet Union, Bin Laden (with Saudi help) gave America a
gift in Afghanistan. Instead of defending the oppressed, he struck at their
ally. If the Arab volunteers in Afghanistan had really wanted to sacrifice
themselves, they could have gone to Beirut when it was under siege, at a time
when the Palestinians and Lebanese desperately needed Arab solidarity. Why
didn't they go? Because the war in Beirut, unlike that in Afghanistan, was
being fought against American imperialism, and this didn't fit their concept.
Osama Bin Laden "beat" communism, but the victory was a Pyrrhic one, and
the first of its victims was the Palestinian people.
Not just this people, however, but all peoples of the world are paying the
price for the Soviet demise. The greatest endeavor in human history here met
its end. Absurdly enough, the capitalist regime too pays the price for its
downfall. The Soviet Union had ensured a measure of political and economic
stability in many lands. Upon its collapse, responsibility passed to the United
States.
The current global problem, however, is not the fact that there is just
one superpower, but the absence of a significant organized political opposition
within that superpower. The US prides itself on being the stronghold of democracy.
What is this democracy? A coterie shuffles power among its members. Around
this magic circle the media form a consensus of specious reasonableness, in
which the human causes of massive suffering pass as immutable laws.
One result of the lack of broad-based opposition in the US has been the
rise of extremist tendencies in the rest of the world. While Americans huddled
cozily, enjoying their "way of life," others have been in decline. It is no
wonder, therefore, that the poor of the earth, among them Islamic peoples,
have developed a deep hatred for America. Its exploitation of them for the
sake of its standard of living, accompanied by indifference to their catastrophes,
has led to the present state of things, where the US has become a target.
A true response to the recent events, on the part of the American people,
would be to take a stand - and offer at last an alternative to the coterie
that got them into this mess. It is not accidental that the movement against
globalization began in Seattle in 1999. This was a good beginning toward building
an alternative. But the recent suicide actions have caught the anti-globalization
movement unprepared. Its lack of readiness shows in the absence of a clear
political program to counter capitalism.
The earth-shaking events of September 11 should make it possible for popular
movements in the industrial nations, and especially in the US, to put politics
back on the public agenda. America still has its masses, its working class,
its unions. It is upon them to put forth a new position, blocking reactionary
trends that threaten to cast the world into anarchy.
As Marxists, we attempt to understand the contradictions of the capitalist
regime and to work for its downfall. Acts of suicidal murder contribute nothing
toward this difficult goal. Our way is long, requiring patience and persistent
labor. Our purpose is to persuade the masses and to organize them within the
framework of political parties, until they are able to realize their democratic
right to determine their own fate.
Politics must be put back on the public agenda, not as an end in itself,
but as a means to return society's resources to society's hands. These resources
ought to be distributed equally among all peoples, so that each may feel itself
to be part of humanity. If this does not happen, what we saw on September
11 will turn out to be part of an ongoing series. Between socialism and barbarism
there is no third alternative. The time has come to choose.
- Translated from the Hebrew by Stephen Langfur.
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